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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
JAMES E. BIXBY, 
Petitioner, 
- and - CASE NO. C-4050 
TOWN-OF GREENE7 
- and -
TEAMSTERS LOCAL 693, 
Employer, 
Intervenor. 
JAMES E. BIXBY, pro se 
TWINING, NEMIA & STEFLIK (JOSEPH STEFLIK of counsel), for 
Employer 
THOMAS THAYNE, for Intervenor 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
On December 14, 1992, James E. Bixby filed a timely petition 
seeking decertification of Teamsters Local 693 (Local) as the 
current negotiating representative of a unit of employees of the 
Town of Greene (Town). 
Thereafter, the parties agreed to conduct an election in a 
unit of employees as follows: 
Included: All full-time employees in the following titles: 
Foreman, MEO/HEO, MEO, Mechanic. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
Pursuant to that agreement, a mail ballot election was held 
on March 23, 1993. Three ballots were cast in favor of 
Case No. C-4050 Page 2 
representation by the Local and four ballots were cast against 
representation. There was one challenged ballot. An objection 
to the election has not been filed. 
A public employer is obliged to negotiate only with a 
recognized or certified employee organization, and an 
organization—©an—be certified—oniy^ Hf-—i-t—d-emonstr-a-te-s—ma^ -o-r-i-ty 
status among unit employees.-1 The issue raised by the instant 
petition is whether the Town's employees desire to be represented 
for the purpose of collective negotiations by the Local. A 
majority of the eligible voters who cast valid ballots have shown 
that they do not desire to be represented for purposes of 
collective negotiations by the Local.^ Accordingly, it is 
ordered that the Local be, and it hereby is, decertified as the 
negotiating agent for the unit previously described. 
DATED: April 27, 1993 
Albany, New York 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Cfia Pauline R. Kinsella, cnair 
Waltej; L. Eisenberg, Membegr 
l r p e r s o n 
Er i c /^chmer tz , Member 
1/ 
2/ 
Rules of Procedure, §201.9 and §201.12(h). 
The one challenged ballot could not affect the outcome of 
the election. Even if it were cast in favor of 
representation by the Local, a tie vote would result, and 
decertification would still be required. See Mohawk Valley 
Nursing Home, 26 PERB ^3009 (1993); Village of Perry, 
14 PERB 54019 (1981); Akron Cent. School Dist., 11 PERB 
?[4010 (1978) . 
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STATE OP NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CHARLES J. SEMOWICH, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-12808 
STATE OPNEW YORK (DEPARTMENT OP 
SOCIAL SERVICES), 
Respondent. 
CHARLES J. SEMOWICH, pro se 
WALTER J. PELLEGRINI, GENERAL COUNSEL (RICHARD W. 
MCDOWELL of counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the State of 
New York (Department of Social Services) (State) to a decision by 
the Assistant Director of Public Employment Practices and 
Representation (Assistant Director). After a hearing, the 
Assistant Director found that the State had violated §209-a.l(a) 
and (c) of the Public Employees7 Fair Employment Act (Act) by 
giving Charles J. Semowich an "effective" job performance 
rating-^ in September 1991 because he had filed a contract 
grievance. 
The State argues in its exceptions that the record is 
insufficient as a matter of law to support the violations found 
by the Assistant Director and that the remedial order, under 
-/An employee's performance may be rated "outstanding", "highly 
effective", "effective", "effective, but needs substantial 
improvement" or "unsatisfactory". 
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which the State is required to give Semowich a "highly effective" 
rating, is arbitrary and inappropriate. 
Semowich argues in response that the Assistant Director's 
decision and order is correct, reasonable and should be affirmed. 
For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the Assistant 
Director's decision and order. 
The Assistant Director did not, as the State argues, rely 
upon only the temporal proximity between Semowich's grievance and 
his effective rating. Nor did the Assistant Director find that 
another employee's higher rating was sufficient by itself to 
raise an inference that would shift the burden of proof to the 
State. In addition to the timing of the State's action and the 
other employee's higher rating, the record also shows that 
Semowich's prior ratings and evaluations were consistently 
"highly effective", that Semowich's grievance involved his 
performance rater's behavior towards him, that no explanation was 
given for his lowered rating, that there were no suggestions or 
comments from Semowich's rater regarding recommended training, 
development or performance improvement activities, and that 
Semowich apparently was the only employee of five whose rating 
was lowered. As the unrebutted record facts were sufficient to 
establish the violations the Assistant Director found, the 
State's exceptions afford us no basis upon which to reverse the 
Assistant Director's decision. 
To remedy the violations found, the Assistant Director 
ordered that Semowich be given a "highly effective" rating. The 
1^ Board - U-12808 -3 
Assistant Director ordered this remedy on the ground that a 
reconsideration of Semowich's rating without regard to his 
grievance activity would not adequately remedy the violations 
found. On the particular facts of this case, we find that the 
remedy ordered by the Assistant Director is appropriate. 
Our remedial orders are designed generally to place an 
employee in the position in which he or she would have been 
without regard to the employee's exercise of protected rights.-' 
The conclusion underlying the Assistant Director's decision is 
that Semowich's rating would not have been lowered from "highly 
effective" to "effective" had he not filed and pursued a 
grievance. Given that conclusion, the only order which will 
fully remedy the violation found is one under which Semowich is 
given the rating he would have received but for his grievance. 
Our decision is limited to the facts of this particular 
case. We are mindful that an employee's evaluation is a 
sensitive function where subjective judgments may have a proper 
and legitimate role and into which we should not unnecessarily 
intrude.-7 However, the evidence presented here of a 
performance rating lowered due to activity protected by the Act, 
which was unrebutted by any evidence of an independent, unrelated 
reason for the rating, compels the remedial relief ordered. 
g/Citv of Dunkirk. 23 PERB [^3025 (1990) . 
-'See New York Inst, of Technology v. State Div. of Human Rights, 
40 N.Y.2d 316 (1976) 
Board - U-12808 
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For the reasons set forth above, the State's exceptions are 
denied and the Assistant Director's decision is affirmed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the State: 
1. Cease and desist from giving Semowich a lower 
performance evaluation rating because he filed or 
prosecuted a contract grievance. 
2. Immediately rescind the rating given Semowich for the 
September 17, 1990 - September 16, 1991 rating period 
and remove it and any reference thereto from its files. 
3. Rate Semowich "highly effective" for the September 17, 
1990 - September 16, 1991 rating period. 
4. Sign and post the attached notice at all locations 
normally used to communicate information to 
employees of the Office of Administrative Support 
Services in the bargaining unit to which Semowich 
belongs. 
DATED: April 27, 1993 
Albany, New York 
iuline R. Kinsella,^ Chai 
-Mz^y. 
rperson 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
APPENDIX 
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees in the Office of Administrative Support Services of the Department of Social Services in the 
bargaining unit represented by the Public Employees Federation that the State: 
1. Will not give Charles J. Semowich a lower performance evaluation rating because he filed or 
prosecuted a contract grievance. 
2. Will immediately rescind the rating given Semowich for the September 17, 1990 -
September 16, 1991 rating period and remove it and any reference thereto from its files. 
j 3. Will rate Semowich "highly effective" for the September 17,1990 - September 16,1991 rating 
period. 
State of New York 
(Department of Social Services) 
nMed By 
1
 y (Representative) (Title) 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered 
by any other material. 
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O STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
NASSAU CHAPTER CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES 
ASSOCIATION, LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
NASSAU LOCAL 830, 
r Charging~Party7 
-and- CASE NO. U-12 989 
COUNTY OF NASSAU, 
Respondent. 
NANCY E. HOFFMAN, GENERAL COUNSEL (JEROME LEFKOWITZ of 
counsel), for Charging Party 
BEE & EISMAN (PETER A. BEE and DANIEL E. WALL of counsel), 
for Respondent 
,i 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Nassau 
Chapter Civil Service Employees Association, Local 1000, AFSCME, 
AFL-CIO, Nassau Local 830 (CSEA) to a decision by an 
Administrative Law Judge (ALT). Although the ALJ dismissed 
several of CSEA's other charges against the County of Nassau 
(County), the exceptions are addressed only to his dismissal of 
Case U-12989. CSEA alleges in that charge that the County 
violated §209-a.l(a) and (d) of the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act (Act) by announcing, and later implementing, a 
furlough plan, limited to CSEA unit employees, which was intended 
to negate a 5.5% salary increase provided by the parties' then 
Board - U-12989 -2 
current 1990-92 collective bargaining agreement.17 According to 
the allegations in the charge, the furlough violates §209-a.l(a) 
of the Act because it is both inherently destructive of CSEA's 
and unit employees' rights and it repudiates the salary 
provisions of the contracts Section—2-0-9—a—l-(-d-) of—the Actis 
allegedly violated because the unilaterally imposed furlough 
diminished employees' salaries. 
The ALJ dismissed the §209-a.l(d) allegation for lack of 
jurisdiction under §205.5(d) of the Act.-7 He held that CSEA's 
allegation that the furlough plan caused a diminution in 
negotiated salary levels merely stated an arguable violation of 
the employees' contractual right to receive wages at the 
negotiated level. Having concluded that the contract was a 
"reasonably arguable source of right"-7 to CSEA with respect to 
the subject matter of that aspect of its charge, the ALJ 
dismissed that allegation. 
Finding no material facts in dispute on a case submitted 
largely on documents, the ALJ dismissed the §209-a.l(a) 
interference allegations on the ground that the County had shown 
that the furlough was implemented under a colorable claim of 
-
7The furlough was actually implemented for only a short time and 
was then discontinued by the County. 
27That section of the Act provides that the Board shall neither 
enforce an agreement nor entertain a charge of a violation 
thereof which would not otherwise violate the Act. 
37Countv of Nassau, 23 PERB 13051, at 3108 (1990). 
Board - U-12989 -3 
contractual management right and for legitimate financial reasons 
in the midst of a budget crisis. 
CSEA argues in its exceptions that the ALJ erred in 
dismissing the subparagraph (d) allegation for lack of 
jurisdiction^ It also—argues—that the^furioughr^was not 
implemented under a bona fide claim of contractual right, but 
that it was retaliatory and/or a per se violation of §209-a.l(a) 
of the Act. 
The County argues that the ALJ's jurisdictional dismissal 
was correct on the facts and the law, as was his dismissal of the 
interference allegations. 
Having considered the parties' arguments, including those 
made at oral argument, we affirm the ALJ's decision. 
The jurisdictional limitation in §205.5(d) of the Act is 
triggered if it can be claimed arguably and reasonably that the 
action subject to the improper practice charge violated the 
parties' contract.-1 
The subject of this charge is an employee furlough plan 
which CSEA alleges was intended to deny its unit employees the 
full salary raise due them in the last year of the contract. We 
find in this respect, as did the ALJ, that CSEA's charge 
constitutes an alleged contract violation because the furlough 
State of New York-Unified Court System. 25 PERB ^3035 (1992). 
Board - U-12989 -4 
plan allegedly diminished employees' contractual salaries.-; 
The arguable violation of those contractual salary provisions 
would be sufficient by itself to necessitate a jurisdictional 
dismissal of the §2 09-a.l(d) allegations. There is, in addition, 
howev^ erv a second source of^arguable contract—right~to CSEA which 
even more clearly establishes the contractual nature of the 
§209-a.l(d) allegation and necessitates its jurisdictional 
dismissal. 
Under the contractual management rights clause, the County 
may "relieve its employees from duty" if there is a "lack of 
work" or if there are "other legitimate reasons". Although the 
clause is plainly, and perhaps primarily, a source of contractual 
rights to the County, this particular clause is also a source of 
right in relevant respect to CSEA.-' The source of right to 
CSEA in the management rights clause is found in the clear 
restriction on the right otherwise reserved to the County to 
relieve employees from duty. As we read the clause, unit 
employees may not be relieved from work except and unless either 
-'We express no opinion, of course, as to the merits of any 
contract questions raised by the furlough. 
-'Compare the management rights clause in another furlough case 
in which the employer's right to "direct, deploy and utilize the 
work force" was not similarly conditioned or restricted. State 
of New York, 10 PERB 14578 (1977), aff'd, 11 PERB f3026 (1978) 
(subsequent case history omitted). Therefore, we had no reason 
to conclude in that case that the management rights clause was 
also a source of right to the union. 
Board - U-12989 -5 
of the two noted conditions is present. In this case, for 
example, if CSEA is correct in its allegation that the County's 
reasons for the furlough were not "legitimate" (i.e., retaliatory), 
the unit employees' contractual right to work is at least 
arguably—abridged^ 
Considering the salary provisions of the contract and CSEA's 
rights under the management rights clause, we conclude that the 
contract is a reasonably arguable source of right to CSEA with 
respect to the furlough plan, which divests us of jurisdiction 
over the §209-a.l(d) allegations. 
We also affirm the AU's dismissal on the merits of the 
subparagraph (a) allegations. 
The §209-a.l(a) allegations are grounded primarily upon a 
claimed per se interference with contractual salary rights or a 
repudiation of contract. Although we have recognized causes of 
action under both theories, common to each is the need to 
establish that the respondent's conduct is taken without any 
colorable claim of right.-7 In these respects, we find, in 
agreement with the ALT, that the acknowledged budget crisis 
facing the County gave it at least a colorable claim of 
legitimate reason to relieve employees from duty in accordance 
with its rights under the management rights clause. As in County 
of Albany, certainly the County's claim that it had legitimate 
-
7County of Albany, 25 PERB f302 6 (1992) (interference with 
contract right); Bd. of Educ. of the City School Dist. of the 
City of Buffalo, 25 PERB f3064 (1992) (repudiation). 
1 Board - U-12989 -6 
reasons to relieve its employees from work for a period of time 
is no more or less valid than CSEA's claim that the County did 
not. That colorable claim of right defeats CSEA's §209-a.l(a) 
claims to the extent they rest on an alleged interference with 
cohtrac^T^ightrs or contract repudiation^ 
CSEA argues alternatively, however, that the County's 
furlough was intended, in fact, to retaliate against CSEA for 
having asserted its statutory right under the Act to refuse to 
reopen the salary provisions of the contract. In support of its 
retaliation allegations, CSEA relies primarily on the fact that 
only CSEA unit employees were to be furloughed and then only for 
) the period of time necessary to recoup the 5.5% salary increase. 
CSEA also relies on the fact that all unit employees were 
subjected to the furlough even though the furlough of a few of 
them did not save the County money because they were in State-
funded positions. 
With respect to this theory of violation, there has been 
made what is, at times, admittedly a subtle but necessary 
distinction between impermissible retaliation for the assertion 
of a protected right and permissible response taken to avoid the 
consequences of that assertion of right.-' Upon our review of 
the record as a whole, we conclude that CSEA's proof of 
retaliation is insufficient to satisfy its burden to establish 
-'See, e.g.f County of Nassau v. PERB, 103 A.D.2d 274, 17 PERB 
f7016 (2d Dep't 1984); City of Albany, 17 PERB H3068 (1984). 
! ) Board - U-12989 
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that the County was improperly motivated in adopting and 
implementing a furlough plan. On this record, therefore, the 
furlough plan must be seen as only a statutorily permissible 
response to a decision by CSEA which presented economic 
consequences to^the^Couhty whicKTiTiTT:eTt constrained to address. 
The County was admittedly facing a budget deficit of 
significant proportions. It first sought wage concessions from 
CSEA before it knew that CSEA would not renegotiate the salary 
raise for the last year of the contract. The County had sought 
and obtained economic concessions from its other employees. 
There is no showing that the burden actually imposed upon CSEA 
unit employees was disproportionate to that imposed upon other 
County employees. There is no proof that the amount of money 
saved by the furlough of CSEA unit employees was more than was 
reasonably necessary in light of the acknowledged budget deficit. 
Nor are there any statements by County agents-7 or other direct 
evidence which would establish an improper motive for the 
furlough. Consideration must also be given to the breadth of the 
relief from duty provisions in the parties' contract. From the 
County's perspective, the furlough plan was a logical, and 
arguably contractually sanctioned, response to make regarding the 
-'CSEA had alleged in a separate charge, for example, that the 
County Executive had stated publicly that the County was singling 
out CSEA for potential layoffs because CSEA was unwilling to 
reopen its contract. The ALT dismissed that charge for failure 
of proof and no exceptions have been filed as to that dismissal. 
Board - U-12989 
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employees represented by CSEA. Although the furlough plan might 
have been crafted somewhat differently, we are persuaded on this 
record that CSEA has not shown that the County's motive for it 
was retaliatory. 
For""thenreasoh^^s^t forth-abovey thei-exceptions are denied 
and the AKT's decision is affirmed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it 
hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: April 27, 1993 
Albany, New York 
Pauline R. KinsellaTchairperson 
//UMZL. Y. 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
Ericjf. Schmertz, Member J\ 
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} STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
WILLIAM T. BRUNS, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-13349 
STATE OF NEW YORK (DIVISION OF PAROLE) and 
COUNCIL 82, AFSCME, 
Respondents. 
KATHLEEN C. BRUNS, for Charging Party 
WALTER PELLEGRINI, GENERAL COUNSEL (LAUREN DE SOLE 
of counsel) for Respondent State of New York 
CHRISTOPHER H. GARDNER, ESQ., for Respondent 
Council 82, AFSCME 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case is before us on exceptions filed by William T. 
Bruns to a ruling-7 by the Assistant Director of Public 
Employment Practices and Representation (Assistant Director). 
Bruns filed this charge against the State of New York (Division 
of Parole) (State) and Council 82, AFSCME (Council 82), his 
bargaining agent. The charge against the State alleges 
violations of §209-a.l(a) and (c) of the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act (Act). Council 82 is alleged to have violated its 
duty of fair representation under §209-a.2(c) of the Act. The 
charge, inter alia, alleges that the State retaliated against 
-''Section 204.7(h) (1) of our Rules of Procedure permits us to 
entertain such exceptions. 
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Bruns because he has filed contract grievances, that the State 
has violated the terms of the contract between it and Council 82, 
that Council 82 has failed to pursue grievances for Bruns, 
settled one of his grievances improperly and otherwise generally 
failed to render him proper representation. 
In January, 1993, Bruns reguested that all proceedings on 
this matter be held in abeyance pending a decision from an 
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) on a different charge Bruns filed 
against the State and Council 82 and Bruns' receipt of 
information from a federal agency on certain wages paid to him 
and on hours worked by him. The ALJ's determination on the other 
charge and the wage and hour information are, according to Bruns, 
relevant to the adjudication of this case, a claim the State and 
Council 82 dispute. On objection from Council 82's attorney, the 
Assistant Director, by letter dated March 2, 1993, denied Bruns' 
request for an adjournment. The case is presently assigned to an 
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) and hearings are scheduled to 
commence on May 10 and 18, 1993. 
The scheduling of a case for hearing is a matter reserved to 
the Director's and the ALJ's discretion. The Assistant 
Director's declination to postpone all proceedings in this case 
did not violate any controlling rule and was consistent with 
agency practice which contemplates that the charging party has 
the factual information necessary to support his/her claims and 
to prove his/her case at the time the charge is filed. There was 
no clear abuse of discretion in refusing to postpone the 
Board - tKL3349 -3 
proceedings in their entirety for an indefinite period of time 
over the objection of one of the parties. There is no reason 
offered or apparent as to why the hearings may not at least begin 
on this multi-faceted charge without benefit of the ALJ's 
determination on the other charge or the wage and hour 
information. Future adjournment requests grounded upon the need 
and relevancy of the disposition on the other charge and the wage 
and hour information can be considered by the presiding ALJ at 
such point in the proceedings as may be warranted by the 
circumstances then prevailing. Bruns argues also that denying 
him a postponement in this case is burdensome because he has 
obligations in conjunction with the appeal and litigation of this 
and other charges he has filed. Obligations incurred as a direct 
result of charges Bruns elected to file afford him no basis for 
an indefinite postponement of proceedings in this case nor do 
they outweigh the right asserted by a respondent, as here, to a 
reasonably prompt litigation and disposition of a charge against 
it. 
For the reasons set forth above, the exceptions to the 
Assistant Director's ruling are denied. SO ORDERED. 
DATED: April 27, 1993 
Albany, New York
 / ^ \ . ^9 \ ' . \ 
Pauline R. Kmsella, Chairperson 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member f 
Eric J/Schmertz, Member 
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") STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CHARLES ACEVEDO, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-12386 
CATSKILL REGIONAL OFF-TRACK BETTING 
CORPORATION, 
Respondent. 
HOLLIS GRIFFIN, ESQ., for Charging Party 
MARK D. STERN, ESQ., for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the Catskill 
Regional Off-Track Betting Corporation (Corporation) to an 
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) decision which found the 
Corporation to have violated §209-a.l(a) and (c) of the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when, on December 26, 1990, 
it terminated the employment of Charles Acevedo in retaliation 
for his efforts to organize fellow employees for the purposes of 
collective negotiations. 
Acevedo was suspended and thereafter terminated by the 
Corporation after fourteen years of employment following an 
incident which occurred at an off-premises, off-hours Christmas 
party conducted by the Corporation on December 16, 1990. At that 
Board - U-12386 -2 
party, Acevedo said to Sherry Brenner, newly appointed Personnel 
Manager, and Steven Pasquale, the Corporation's Field Auditor: 
[T]hat guy over there [pointing to Arthur Weinfeld, the 
Corporation's Vice President and Director of 
Operations], that guy is a dick. That guy is a dick. 
He fired my best-friends He^s^a^drck. 
Weinfeld, who overheard at least a portion of Acevedo's 
statements as he was walking by the group, asked what was being 
said. 
On the following day, after receiving memoranda from Brenner 
and Pasquale detailing the incident, and from Jay Gettinger, the 
Corporation's General Services Administrator, who had not heard 
the remarks, but had a subsequent private conversation with 
Acevedo, during which Acevedo referred to Weinfeld as "that 
prick", Weinfeld had a meeting with Acevedo. At that meeting, 
Acevedo initially denied the incident and then attributed it, 
assuming he had made the remark, to his consumption of too much 
alcohol at the party, and apologized for it.-7 Weinfeld 
immediately thereafter suspended, and then terminated, Acevedo. 
In support of his claim that his termination would not have 
occurred, notwithstanding the incident, but for his protected 
activities, Acevedo established that he had, within six months 
prior to his termination, engaged in union organizing activity 
and an election, which was unsuccessful, although by a lesser 
-'The sincerity and extent of the apology are in issue between 
the parties. 
Board - U-12386 -3 
margin than two elections held during the early 1980s. Acevedo 
also established that his employer was aware of his protected 
activities, thus meeting the second prong of the test for 
establishing unlawful discrimination under the Act.-' In 
support of his claim that he would not have been terminated but 
for his protected activity, Acevedo sought to establish a number 
of prior incidents of alleged disparate treatment of him. 
Without deciding whether disparate treatment had in fact taken 
place in the prior incidents asserted by Acevedo, the ALJ looked 
to an earlier history of findings of unlawful interference with 
protected activities, based upon cases decided by this agency, 
and involving at least some of the same managerial individuals 
involved in the instant case, including Weinfeld.-7 In addition 
to this case law history, the ALJ placed weight upon his 
determination that the penalty of termination imposed upon 
Acevedo was excessive, particularly when viewed in light of the 
more serious nature of the offenses which had in other cases 
given rise to penalties of termination by the Corporation, such 
as substantial and repeated cash shortfalls. The ALJ also 
determined the penalty of termination to be excessive in light of 
Acevedo's apology to Weinfeld for his conduct and the 
-/See, e.g. , City of Salamanca, 18 PERB J[3012 (1985) . 
-
7The ALJ referenced the following cases involving the 
Corporation: 15 PERB ^3023 (1982), aff'cr 14 PERB [^4054 (1981); 
15 PERB 53022 (1982); 14 PERB ^4518 (1981); 14 PERB 14011 (1981); 
and 13 PERB 1[4028 (1980) . 
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circumstances of the incident, which involved off-duty, off-
premises drinking. 
In its exceptions, the Corporation makes two main 
assertions. First, it argues before us that the ALT erred in 
relying upon case determinations made by PERB concerning events 
which occurred eight or ten years earlier as being both too 
remote in time and considered sua sponte, that is, without any 
argument by Acevedo that the case determinations issued earlier 
had any relevance to the instant proceedings. The Corporation 
further asserts that the ALJ should have made determinations 
concerning each of the claimed instances of disparate treatment 
upon which Acevedo relied, and which the parties litigated, to 
determine whether they in fact constituted instances of disparate 
treatment, in order to evaluate the merit of Acevedo's claim that 
his termination was part of a continuing course of disparate 
treatment. According to the Corporation, if those assertions of 
disparate treatment were found to be without basis, Acevedo's 
claim of disparate treatment with respect to his termination must 
fail. 
Second, the Corporation asserts that the ALJ erred in basing 
his determination of disparate treatment with respect to the 
termination of Acevedo upon a value judgment regarding the 
excessiveness of the penalty in relation to the offense 
committed. The Corporation asserts that the ALJ's evaluation of 
the penalty cannot properly provide a basis for determining that 
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the penalty, however excessive it might have been, constituted 
proof of anti-union animus, particularly since there were no 
prior cases presented which involved similar conduct with 
different outcomes. Indeed, no evidence was presented which 
established an incident remotely similar to the December 16, 1990 
incident involving Acevedo. 
While we agree with the ALJ that the prior case history 
involving the Corporation, and the determinations made several 
years earlier but involving some of the same Corporation 
representatives, are relevant to the case now before us, we 
cannot conclude that such determinations of prior misconduct are 
dispositive of the present claim of misconduct. Without evidence 
of anti-union animus closer in time and more directly related to 
Acevedo's protected activities, it cannot be said that the prior 
determinations constitute dispositive proof of a continuing 
course of conduct which resulted in the action complained of. 
The ALJ's determination that the penalty imposed of 
termination for the at-issue incident was excessive is not 
unreasonable in light of the circumstances surrounding the 
incident. These include Acevedo's fourteen years of satisfactory 
service; the absence of any prior incidents of this type 
involving Acevedo; the fact that the evidence established only 
that three managerial persons, Weinfeld, Brenner and Pasguale, 
and no one else, even standersby in close proximity to Acevedo, 
heard any portion of the remarks; that the incident occurred at a 
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social event rather than at the workplace; and that Acevedo 
tendered an apology for his remarks. However, notwithstanding 
these circumstances, we must disagree with the ALJ's 
determination to the extent it concludes that the excessiveness 
of the penalty constitutes dispositive proof of improper 
motivation or otherwise establishes that but for the incident, 
Acevedo would not have been terminated. 
If the entire evidence presented by Acevedo had consisted of 
the foregoing, we would be constrained to reverse the ALJ's 
determination and dismiss this charge. However, the record 
establishes that Acevedo sought to prove other instances of 
disparate treatment of him proximate in time to the December 16, 
1990 incident. He also sought to establish a workplace practice 
which included the use of foul language in the presence of 
supervisors, which, if proven, might establish that the type of 
language used on December 16, 1990, had been accepted without 
reprimand on other occasions; that Acevedo was under the 
influence of alcohol when he made the remarks, and thereafter 
apologized in a sincere fashion for them; and that remarks 
evidencing anti-union animus were made to him. 
Findings of fact with regard to the foregoing evidentiary 
issues are most appropriately made by the ALJ who heard the 
testimony and had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the 
witnesses. It would not be appropriate for us, ab initio, to 
make such findings, particularly since credibility determinations 
Board - U-12386 
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may be necessary to resolve issues of fact. It is, therefore, 
necessary that we remand this matter to the assigned ALJ for 
further findings, which he declined to make in the decision now 
before us, and for a new determination based upon those findings 
of fact. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that this matter be, and it hereby 
is, reversed and remanded for further findings of fact and 
conclusions of law not inconsistent with this decision and order. 
DATED: April 27, 1993 
Albany, New York 
'auline R. KinselLa-> Chai rperson 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
2F- 4/27/93 
) STATE OP NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
RICHARD W. GLASHEEN, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-13463 
COUNTY OF SUFFOLK and SUFFOLK ASSOCIATION 
OF MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES, 
Respondents. 
RICHARD W. GLASHEEN, pro se 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
By decision dated October 27, 1992, the Director of Public 
) Employment Practices and Representation (Director) dismissed this 
charge filed by Richard W. Glasheen (Glasheen), acting pro se, 
against the County of Suffolk (County). The charge, as amended, 
alleges that the County and the Suffolk Association of Municipal 
Employees (AME) violated §209-a.l(a), (b) and (c) and §209-a.2(a) 
and (b), respectively, of the Public Employees' Fair Employment 
Act (Act) by conspiring to undermine his supervisory authority 
and remove him from his position at Suffolk County Community 
College (College). 
The Director dismissed the charge after advising Glasheen 
that the charge, as amended four times, was deficient, on several 
grounds. First, the charge of a violation of §209-a.2(b) of the 
Act was dismissed summarily as the Director found Glasheen had no 
standing to allege a violation of the duty to negotiate in good 
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faith; second, nearly all of the conduct about which Glasheen 
complains is time-barred from consideration, having occurred more 
than four months before the charge was filed. 
The only allegation which falls within the four-month 
limitation period provided by our Rules is that on December 31, 
1991, Glasheen received a memorandum from his supervisor which 
Glasheen characterizes as a letter of reprimand.-7 Glasheen 
argues that he received the memorandum as a result of complaints 
by AME, the bargaining agent for employees supervised by him. 
The Director found that these asserted facts would not establish 
that the County's conduct in issuing the memorandum on 
December 31, 1991 was motivated by Glasheen7s exercise of rights 
protected by the Act. Accordingly, the Director dismissed the 
portion of the charge alleging a violation of §209-a.l(c) of the 
Act. 
In his exceptions, Glasheen argues that due to the animus of 
AME employees toward him, disciplinary action, in the form of a 
letter of reprimand, was taken against him and that the College 
has improperly limited his authority in unspecified ways. 
In a prior decision,-7 we dismissed a charge filed by 
Glasheen which alleged that he was transferred from one location 
-'Despite being requested to do so, Glasheen has declined to 
submit a copy of that memorandum in support of his charge, and it 
is accordingly impossible to determine its content or the 
relevance, if any, of the memorandum to any alleged violation of 
rights protected by the Act. 
25 PERB ?[3019 (1992) . 
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to another at the College also as a result of complaints by AME 
and its members concerning his supervisory conduct. We there 
said (at 3040): 
Thus, even if, as Glasheen alleges, the communications 
between the County and AME may have affected Glasheen's 
employment relationship, that circumstance alone does 
notr-constituteimproperInterferencerwith-GTasheen ' s 
rights under §209-a.l(a) of the Act or improper support 
of AME under §209-a.l(b) of the Act. [footnote 
omitted]. 
For the same reason that we dismissed his prior charge, we 
dismiss the instant charge also. There is nothing in the 
allegations made by Glasheen here which would constitute a 
violation of the Act by either the County or AME, even if, as 
Glasheen asserts, a letter of reprimand would not have been 
issued to him but for the complaints of AME and its members to 
the County. For these reasons, we deny Glasheen's exceptions, 
affirm the Director's decision, and dismiss the charge. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge be, and it hereby 
is, dismissed. 
DATED: April 27, 1993 
Albany, New York 
•yS\Jf.-*• f~/ W> r\Vi\ \ 
PauLine R. K i n s e l l L , Chai rperson 
Walteje-lL E i senberg , Member C 
E r i c 0/T Schmertz, Member 
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C) STATE OP NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
SCHENECTADY POLICE BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NOS. U-12538 
& U-13100 
CITY OF SCHENECTADY, 
Respondent. 
6RASS0 & 6RASS0 (KATHLEEN R. DeCATALDO of counsel), 
for Charging Party 
ROEMER & FEATHERSTONHAUGH, P.C. (ELAYNE G. GOLD 
of counsel), for Respondent 
) 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
The Schenectady Police Benevolent Association (PBA) has 
filed exceptions to the dismissal by the Assistant Director of 
Public Employment Practices and Representation (Assistant 
Director) of its charges in Case Nos. U-12538 and U-13100, which 
allege that the City of Schenectady (City) violated §209-a.l(d) 
and §209-a.l(a), (c) and (d) of the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act (Act), respectively. In Case No. U-12538, the 
PBA alleges that the City required unit employees hired on or 
after July 12, 1988, to complete and sign a "Residency 
Affidavit". In Case No. U-13100, the PBA alleges that the City, 
by a unilaterally issued September 10, 1991 memorandum, imposed 
^ the residency requirement and a procedure for appealing 
determinations thereunder, made residency a criterion for 
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promotion, and required all covered employees to sign a form 
acknowledging receipt of the memorandum. 
We affirm the Assistant Director's dismissal of the 
allegations regarding the imposition of the residency 
requirement, its appeals procedure, and the creation of a 
promotional criterion based on residency for the reasons set 
forth in his decision. As he noted, the residency requirement 
and its appeals procedure were the subjects of a final and binding 
decision of a PERB Administrative Law Judge-7 in March 1989-7 
pursuant to an improper practice charge filed by the PBA in 
November 1988. That decision upheld the residency requirement as 
a nonmandatory subject of negotiations, but found that the 
unilateral imposition of the appeals procedure violated the Act. 
As to the residency requirement, therefore, the September 1991 
memorandum did not reflect a change, but merely a reaffirmation 
of the 1988 policy. Nor will the PBA be permitted to relitigate 
the prior determination that the residency requirement is a 
nonmandatory subject of negotiations. 
The PBA's assertion in its brief that the September 1991 
memorandum imposes the residency requirement on a class of 
employees not previously covered is without merit. The PBA 
relies on the uncontroverted fact that the City did not provide 
-' No exceptions to the ALJ's decision were perfected by either 
party. Rules of Procedure, §204.14(b) and (c). 
^City of Schenectady, 22 PERB [^4527 (1989) . While this decision 
is correctly cited by the Assistant Director, the text of his 
decision misdates it as March 1988. 
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notice of the residency requirement to the at-issue employees 
until issuance of the September 1991 memorandum. It argues that, 
absent notification at time of hire, said employees were not 
hired pursuant to the residency requirement and, therefore, that 
the City's September 1991 memorandum imposes the residency 
requirement on them for the first time. However, as relevant 
here, the 1988 City ordinance applies by its express terms to all 
unit employees hired on or after July 12, 1988. The PBA assumes 
that, as a matter of law, a residency requirement is not imposed 
absent express notification to an employee upon hire, but cites 
no legal support for its assumption, which is unfounded. The PBA 
does not cite the language of the ordinance itself in support of 
its argument. We note that while the ordinance does direct that 
covered employees be placed on notice of its terms, such notice 
is not a condition precedent to the existence of the residency 
requirement under the Act.-7 The PBA's exception is therefore 
dismissed. 
Regarding the appeals procedure, a remedial order was issued 
by PERB in the 1989 decision. Section 213 of the Act provides 
the sole procedures for the enforcement of PERB's orders and an 
improper practice charge is not one of them. As to the 
promotional criterion based on residency, the Assistant Director 
correctly noted that promotional criteria are nonmandatory 
-''Whether the ordinance can be challenged in other forums based 
on alleged failure to comply with the notification requirement is 
not relevant here. Absent repeal of the ordinance, neither 
claimed nor evidenced here, it, and the residency requirement 
therein, exist for purposes of the Act. 
O Board - U-12538 and U-13000 -4 
subjects of negotiations. Therefore, any imposition of residency 
as a criterion for promotion, even if newly imposed,-7 would not 
violate the Act. 
The Assistant Director's dismissal of the remaining 
allegations of the charge in Case No. U-12538, on the basis that 
the City did not order the affidavit completed or threaten 
discipline for noncompliance, must be reversed. It is undisputed 
that in May 1991 the City sent a "Residency Affidavit" to all 
employees hired on or after the July 12, 1988 effective date of 
the residency requirement. The form calls for the provision of 
the employee's years of employment, residence address and 
duration of residency at that address, for the employee's 
acknowledgement that a violation of the City's residency 
requirement could result in termination, authorizes the City to 
request records,-7 and directs the attachment of copies of the 
employee's driver's license and voter registration card. An 
employer's service on employees of forms, as here, with areas for 
completion, lines upon which to execute them, and/or instructions 
for the attachment of documents, without indication, express or 
through known practice, that they are informational only 
constitutes a direction that they be completed and returned. 
Further, a disciplinary component exists as it does regarding the 
-
7The Assistant Director did not make a finding on whether the 
September 1991 memorandum actually sets such a criterion. Based 
on our determination above, we need not specifically address this 
i issue. 
-
7The Assistant Director assumed that the request was to be made 
to the employee. There is no reason to question that conclusion. 
V J 
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failure to comply with any employer work order. Here, the 
departmental rules and regulations state that disobedience of an 
order and insubordination may result in disciplinary action, and 
that violation "of a rule or regulation of the Department, or of 
the provisions of any order...or of disobedience of orders..." 
may result in dismissal or "such other punishment as the City 
Manager may direct." That no disciplinary action was taken or 
threatened when the unit employees failed to submit the forms is 
not controlling; the possibility of discipline remains 
outstanding. We therefore find that the City unilaterally 
required employee completion of the forms and that a disciplinary 
component existed.-'' 
We reject the City's assertion in its brief that the issue 
of employee completion of the affidavit-7 was raised for the 
first time in the PBA's brief to this Board and is, therefore, 
not properly before us and that the only issue for decision is 
whether notice was received. As to the former, the charge in 
Case No. U-12538 clearly and at length alleges that the required 
completion of the affidavit violated the Act. As to the latter, 
that the notice may have been the only factual dispute between 
the parties does not make it, and it is not, the only issue for 
decision. 
-/Based on this determination, we need not address the remainder 
of the PBA's exceptions on these issues. 
-/Based on our determination infra, we need not reach the City's 
identical claim regarding the form in Case No. U-13100. 
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As to the mandatory nature of the employee action required, 
it is well settled that the unilateral delegation to unit 
employees of the responsibility for employer recordkeeping 
violates the Act.-7 While certain changes in the method of 
recordkeeping may not rise to the level of a change in terms and 
conditions of employment,-7 substantial changes in the type or 
amount of information recorded affect terms and conditions of 
employment and therefore must be bargained.—7 Here, the 
employees have in the past been required to keep the City 
apprised of any changes in address, and have filed a form to do 
so. The City's argument that its right to impose the residency 
requirement carries with it the implicit right to employee 
participation in the compliance-tracking process need not, 
therefore, be decided. It already has a practice of employee 
participation in the recordkeeping process. The relevant inquiry 
is whether the at-issue form reflects merely, as the City asserts 
in its brief, a "mechanical", and not a qualitative, change in 
unit employees' participation. It does not. The at-issue form 
is substantially different from the one previously filed, 
including a monetary component, as the employee may have to pay a 
g/See, e.g. Newburcfh Enlarged City School Dist. , 2 0 PERB ^3 053 
(1987); Spencerport Cent. School Dist., 16 PERB [^3074 (1983); 
BOCES I. Suffolk County. 15 PERB H[4622 (1982) ; County of Nassau, 
13 PERB 54612 (1980), exceptions dismissed, 14 PERB J[3014 (1981), 
aff'd. County of Nassau v. PERB, 14 PERB ?[7023 (Sup. Ct. Nassau 
Co. 1981); Hampton Bays School Dist.. 10 PERB f4596 (1977). 
g/Island Trees Union Free School Dist. , 10 PERB [^4590 (1977) ; 
Newburgh Enlarged City School Dist., supra. 
-'See supra note 8. 
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notary fee in order to get the required notarization, and the 
required provision of a voter registration card, which alone 
raises a significant privacy issue.—/ Also unlike the earlier 
form, the at-issue form requires the provision of a copy of the 
employee's driver's license and the number of years of continuous 
residence at the employee's present address, that the employee 
agree to the open-ended release of other unidentified records at 
the City's request, that the employee acknowledge the accuracy of 
the description of the City's ordinance set forth therein, the 
applicability of the Penal Law to any false statements and that 
lack of proper residence can result in termination, and signature 
under acknowledged penalty of perjury. 
As we noted recently in a case between these same parties 
involving General Municipal Law (GML) §207-c:—' 
The City has processed GML §207-c claims for 
years under procedures different from those 
it adopted in February and March 1990, 
thereby establishing that the new procedures 
were not minimally necessary to the 
implementation of GML §207-c. The City may 
have found those earlier procedures to be 
inadequate to its current purposes, but that 
does not permit the City to avoid its 
obligation under the Act regarding the 
imposition of the new GML §2 07-c 
requirements. 
—
;See the discussion of privacy in Bd. of Educ. of the City 
School Dist. of the City of New York. 19 PERB 53015, at 3033 
(1986), conf'd, 21 PERB f7001 (Sup. Ct. Albany Co. 1988), rev'd. 
147 A.D.2d 70, 22 PERB ^7014 (3d Dep't 1989), rev'd, 75 N.Y.2d 
660, 23 PERB 17012 (1990). 
^
7Citv of Schenectady, 25 PERB ^3022, at 3047 (1992), conf'd in 
relevant part, 25 PERB 57009 (Sup. Ct. Alb. Co. 1992) . 
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Here, the City does not even claim that the recordkeeping 
procedure it has devised is "minimally necessary" to implement 
its residency requirement.—7 Even if it had, the record would 
not support it.—7 
While the City also appears to argue that it had a 
compelling need to send the affidavit, such a defense is not 
properly before us, as it was not raised before the Assistant 
Director.—7 Even if considered on its merits it would fail, 
most obviously because the party claiming compelling need must 
negotiate to the point of impasse and hold itself out to 
negotiate after the change.—7 Here, the City did neither. In 
any event, the delay of approximately three years between 
—
7See also County of Niagara (Mount View Health Facility), 
21 PERB f3014 (1988). 
—
7Further, Public Officers Law §30 is devoid of any language 
supporting the authorization the City claims, nor does the City 
rely on any statutory language therein or point to any case law 
thereunder. City of Schenectady, supra. The same is true 
regarding any City reliance on its local ordinance for such 
authority. In any event, a local law generally cannot supersede 
the requirements of a state statute, here, the duty to negotiate 
under the Act. See, e.g., Avon Cent. School Dist., 20 PERB 54564 
(1987). See also the discussion and cases cited in Bd. of Educ. 
of the City School Dist. of the City of New York, 19 PERB 53015, 
at 3033 (1986), confid, 21 PERB 57001 (Sup. Ct. Albany Co. 1988), 
rev'd, 147 A.D.2d 70, 22 PERB 57014 (1989), rev'd, 75 N.Y.2d 660, 
23 PERB 57012 (1990); Clarkstown Cent. School Dist., 24 PERB 
54544, aff'd on other grounds, 24 PERB 53047 (1991). 
•^
7New York City Transit Auth., 20 PERB 53037 (1987), confid, 147 
A.D.2d 574, 22 PERB 57001 (2d Dep't 1989), motion to amend 
granted, 156 A.D.2d 689, 23 PERB 57002 (2d Dep't 1989). 
—
7See, e.g., Cohoes City School Dist., 12 PERB 53113, at 3204 
(1979) . 
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upholding the residency requirement and the City's efforts to 
ascertain compliance negate any claim of compelling need.—7 
As regarding the "Residency Affidavit" above, the City's 
provision of the acknowledgement form in Case No. U-13100 
constituted an order that it be executed and returned. However, 
the PBA's allegation that that action violated §2 09-a.l(d) of the 
Act is dismissed. An employee acknowledgement of receipt has, at 
best, de minimus effect on terms and conditions of employment. 
Finally, the PBA's objection to the Assistant Director's 
refusal to accept its reply brief is rejected. As PERB's Rules 
of Procedure contain no provision for reply briefs, the Assistant 
Director's ruling was not inappropriate. 
) 
Based on the above, we find that the City violated 
§2 09-a.l(d) of the Act by requiring employees hired on or after 
July 12, 1988 in the unit represented by the PBA to complete, 
sign and return to the City a "Residency Affidavit". 
The PBA's exceptions are in all other respects denied, the 
charge in Case No. U-13100 dismissed in its entirety and the 
charge in Case No. U-12538 dismissed except as set forth above. 
—See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. of the City School Dist. of the City of 
New York. 18 PERB 14621 (1985), aff'd, 19 PERB 13015 (1986), 
conf'd. 21 PERB 17001 (Sup. Ct. Albany Co. 1988), rev'd, 147 
A.D.2d 70, 22 PERB 17014 (1989), rev'd, 75 N.Y.2d 660, 23 PERB 
f7012 (1990). 
If any further reason were necessary, there is, as stated 
above, no record evidence that such employee participation was 
necessary in order to ensure compliance. 
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NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER the City to: 
1. Immediately rescind and cease enforcement or 
implementation of the "Residency Affidavit" as to unit employees; 
2. Immediately remove and destroy all reports or other 
documents submitted by unit employees or generated by the City or 
its agents pursuant to its requirement that they complete, sign 
and return to the City the "Residency Affidavit" from any files 
kept or maintained by the City or any of its agents; 
3. Sign and post notice in the form attached at all 
locations at which any affected unit employees work in places 
ordinarily used to post notices of information to such unit 
employees. 
DATED: April 27, 1993 
Albany, New York 
APPENDIX 
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees in the City of Schenectady in the bargaining unit represented by the Schenectady Police 
Benevolent Association that the City: 
1. Will immediately rescind and cease enforcement or implementation of the "Residency Affidavit" as to unit 
employees; 
2. Will immediately remove and destroy all reports or other documents submitted by unit employees or 
generated by the City or its agents pursuant to its requirement that they complete, sign and return to the City 
the "Residency Affidavit" from any files kept or maintained by the City or any of its agents; 
CITY OF SCHENECTADY 
nqted By 
\ ) (Representative) (Title) 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered 
by any other material. 
2H- 4/27/93 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
VERNON 6. DICKTEN, SR., 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4023 
GREENWOOD LAKE UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer, 
-and-
LOCAL 807, INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF 
TEAMSTERS, 
Intervenor. 
) 
VERNON 6. DICKTEN, SR., pro se 
JOHN M. CANZONERI, for Employer 
ROBERT RABBITT, for Intervenor 
BOARD ORDER 
On March 24, 1993, the Director of Public Employment 
Practices and Representation issued a decision in the above 
matter finding that the petition filed by Vernon G. Dickten, Sr., 
(petitioner) to decertify Local 807, International Brotherhood of 
Teamsters as negotiating representative for certain of its 
employees should be granted for lack of opposition.^ No 
exceptions have been filed to the decision. 
26 PERB 14020 (1993). 
Case No. - C-4023 page 2 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Local 807, International 
Brotherhood of Teamsters be, and it hereby is, decertified as the 
negotiating representative of the following unit of employees of 
the employer: 
Included: All bus drivers. 
Excluded:—All other employees. 
DATED: April 27, 1993 
Albany, New York 
u'line R. Kinsella, Chai Pa lin rperson 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member/ 
Eric J./Schmertz, Member 
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^ STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
NEW YORK STATE INSPECTION, SECURITY 
AND LAW ENFORCEMENT EMPLOYEES, 
DISTRICT COUNCIL 82, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner^ 
-and- CASE NO. C-3991 
COUNTY OF SCHENECTADY AND SCHENECTADY 
COUNTY SHERIFF, 
Employer, 
-and-
SCHENECTADY COUNTY SHERIFFS' BENEVOLENT 
ASSOCIATION, 
) Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Schenectady County Sheriffs' 
Benevolent Association has been designated and selected by a 
majority of the employees of the above-named public employer, in 
the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
Certification - C-3991 - 2 -
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: Principal Typist, Senior Typist, Cook, Civil 
Enforcement Officer, Patrol Officer, 
Physician's Assistant, Correction Sergeant, 
Correction Lieutenant, Senior Account Clerk 
Typist, Typist, Correction Officer, Dispatcher 
Sheriff, Dispatcher Sergeant, Patrol 
Lieutenants 
Excluded: All other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Schenectady County 
Sheriffs' Benevolent Association. The duty to negotiate 
collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable 
times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and 
other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of 
an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the 
execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement 
reached if requested by either party. Such obligation does not 
compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making 
of a concession. 
DATED: April 27, 1993 
Albany, New York 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chaii irperson 
/ 
lAjjUZ-Z-
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
Eric^J. Schmertz, Member; 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
SCHOOL ALLIANCE OF SUBSTITUTES IN 
EDUCATION, NEW YORK STATE UNITED TEACHERS, 
AFT, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner^ 
-and- CASE NO. C-4053 
SCOTIA-GLENVILLE CENTRAL SCHOOL DSITRICT, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the School Alliance of 
Substitutes in Education, New York State United Teachers, AFT, 
AFL-CIO has been designated and selected by a majority of the 
employees of the above-named public employer, in the unit agreed 
upon by the parties and described below, as their exclusive 
representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the 
settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: All per diem substitute teachers, including 
long-term itinerant substitute teachers. 
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Excluded: All other employees of the District. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the School Alliance of 
Substitutes in Education, New York State United Teachers, AFT, 
AFL-CIO. The duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual 
obligation to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith 
with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of 
employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question 
arising thereunder, and the execution of a written agreement 
incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party. 
Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a 
proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: April 27, 1993 
Albany, New York 
^51 Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
UXL i«w <t« ^ i ^ U ^ U A - L ^ 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
Eric/^ T. Schmertz, Membe} 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
UNITED PUBLIC SERVICE EMPLOYEES UNION 
LOCAL 424, A DIVISION OF UNITED INDUSTRY 
WORKERS DISTRICT COUNCIL 424, 
^Petitioners, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4059 
COUNTY OF ROCKLAND, 
Employer, 
-and-
LOCAL 823, NEW YORK COUNCIL 66, AFSCME, 
Intervenor. 
) : ; 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above 
matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the 
Public Employees7 Fair Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the 
Board, and it appearing that a negotiating representative has been 
selected, , 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the United Public Service Employees 
Union, Local 424, A Division of United Industry Workers District Council 
424 has been designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the 
above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and 
) 
described below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of 
collective negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Cer t i f i ca t ion - C-4059 - 2 -
Unit: Included: Employees of the Division of Construction and 
Maintenance of the Rockland County Highway Department 
in the following titles: Laborer I, Laborer II, Motor 
Equipment Operator I, Assistant Automotive Mechanic, 
Assistant Building Maintenance Mechanic, Highway 
Maintenance Mechanic, Motor Equipment Operator II, 
Storekeeper (Highway), Automotive Mechanic, Motor 
Equipment Operator III, Road Inspector, Skilled 
Laborer^—Yard Supervisor7 Highway Maintenance 
Supervisor I, and Shop Supervisor. 
Excluded: Highway Maintenance Supervisor II, Highway Maintenance 
Supervisor III, and all other employees of the Rockland 
County Highway Department. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the United Public Service Employees Union, 
Local 424, A Division of United Industry Workers District Council 424. The 
duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at 
reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and 
other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an 
agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a 
written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if requested by 
either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a 
proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: April 27, 1993 
Albany, New York 
ml 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
Walter L. Eisenberq, Member 
Eric y{ Schmertz, Member 
